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This paper analyzes a unit-contingent power purchase agreement between an electricity distributor and a
power plant. Under such a contract the distributor pays the plant a fixed price if the plant is operational and
nothing if plant outage occurs. Pricing a unit-contingent contract is complicated by the fact that the plant’s
true status is its private information. The difference between the electricity spot price and the unit-contingent
contract price provides an incentive for the plant to misreport its status and earn profit at the distributor’s
expense. To prevent misreporting, the distributor may inspect the plant and levy penalties if misreporting is
discovered. We find that some type of misreporting under certain circumstances can benefit both the plant and
the distributor, because it serves as a risk-allocation mechanism between the two parties. We show that such a
risk-allocation mechanism is equivalent to using state-contingent options and prohibiting misreporting.
1. Introduction
Electric power plants typically sell electricity to distributors pursuant to either “unit-contingent” or
“financially firm” power supply contracts (Zaccaria et al. 2006). For example, Wabash Valley Power
Association (WVPA), a generation and transmission cooperative that provides wholesale electricity
to 28 distribution systems in the Midwest, has increased its unit-contingent power supply from about
24% of its total energy supply resources in 2005 to about 58% in 2009 (WVPA 2005, 2009). In the
summer of 2009, WVPA’s energy supply resources totaled 2,200 megawatts (MW), including 1,280
MW of unit-contingent contracts and 920 MW of firm contracts. In another example, California
Independent System Operator (2003) reported that the net unit-contingent imports into California
were as high as 3,000 MW, which accounted for about half of the total net imports.
In both firm and unit-contingent contracts, the distributor purchases a certain amount of power
from a specific power generating unit at a predetermined price per megawatt hour (referred to as
the firm contract price and unit-contingent contract price, respectively). Under the unit-contingent
contract, the distributor pays the plant only when the power generating unit is operational (hence
the transaction is unit-contingent), and in the event of an unplanned outage (e.g., generation facility
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failures or transmission facility failures that force the plant to be down), the plant is not financially
responsible to the distributor and, consequently, the distributor has to purchase replacement power
in the spot market. In contrast, under a firm contract, the plant must compensate the distributor for
the cost of replacement power in the case of an unplanned outage. Thus, the financial risk associated
with purchasing replacement power is borne by the power plant under the firm contract, and borne
by the distributor under the unit-contingent contract. By shifting the risk of purchasing replacement
power from the plant to the distributor, the unit-contingent contract stabilizes the power plant’s
income, which is often a necessary requirement for the plant to obtain financing.
To compensate the distributor for taking on the risk of purchasing replacement power, the price
of the unit-contingent contract is typically lower than the firm contract price. It might not seem
difficult to determine the unit-contingent contract price based on the unit-specific outage frequency
and the spot price distribution. However, pricing the unit-contingent contract is complicated by
the fact that the distributor cannot directly observe whether the plant indeed has an outage. In
practice, the electricity flows are determined by the system operator and the distributor does not
receive power directly from the plant. Each day, the plant reports to the distributor whether or not
the power generating unit was operational on the previous operating day. The distributor pays the
plant at the unit-contingent price if and only if the unit is reported to be on.
There is a potential incentive for the plant to misreport its status. When the electricity spot
price is higher than the unit-contingent contract price, the plant that is up has an incentive to report
to the distributor that the generating unit is down and sell electricity to the spot market. This hurts
the distributor who has to buy replacement power at the higher spot price.
Conversely, when the spot price is lower than the unit-contingent contract price, the plant that
is down has an incentive to buy electricity on the spot, supply it to the distributor, and report to
the distributor that the generating unit is up. The distributor is also hurt because it could have
bought the electricity at the lower spot price. Note that the plant reporting up when down is very
different from a supplier’s extra effort to fulfill the contract in the context of other manufacturing
environments. It is typically costly to mitigate supply disruptions in a manufacturing environment
due to higher procurement cost from alternative sources and logistic cost, whereas in the electricity
industry, the grid provides easy access to the spot market for purchasing replacement power. Because
of the electricity market’s volatility, the spot price is frequently lower than the contract price. When
that happens, plant outages allow the distributor to lower its procurement cost, but the plant’s
misreporting up deprives the distributor of that opportunity.
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In the appendix, we present an example of possible misreporting behavior and its financial impact.
We discuss related market regulations and explain why misreporting behavior in bilateral contracts
is not monitored and why the system operator protects the plant’s private information. Here we
continue to discuss how the distributor views the misreporting problem.
It might appear that the distributor prefers the plant to always truthfully report its status. To
enforce truthful reporting, the distributor could inspect the plant at a cost, e.g., administrative cost
and legal fees for access to the plant’s internal records or its account at the system operator. If
misreporting is found, penalties can be levied. In practice, however, the distributor typically does
not conduct inspections to recover potential damages. A manager at an electricity distributor firm
revealed to us that they were aware of some plant’s suspicious behavior but never conducted an
inspection, because they found the unit-contingent contracts were lucrative after all: The risk-free
profit during the “up” times outweighed the loss during the “down” times in the past. Furthermore,
the distributor may have an impression that a little bit of misreporting by the plant brings extra
profits to the plant, and thus the plant is willing to accept a lower unit-contingent contract price.
However, the manager was not sure whether tolerating misreporting is really better or worse than
prohibiting misreporting and offering a higher contract price.
We aim to address the following questions: Can the seemingly undesirable misreporting bring
benefit to both parties? If so, under what circumstances should the distributor tolerate what type
of misreporting? If tolerating some type of misreporting is not practical, what is a practical way to
manage misreporting?
We show that, indeed, under some conditions the plant’s misreporting benefits both the plant
and the distributor because a certain type of misreporting reallocates the risk between the two
parties. Specifically, misreporting is beneficial when the plant is down and the spot price falls into
a region below the contract price. By purchasing electricity on the spot market to deliver to the
distributor and misreporting up, the down plant gains a positive profit, which should belong to the
distributor under truthful reporting. Anticipating this loss, the distributor lowers the contract price
upfront. If the plant is risk-averse, the reduction in the contract price can exceed the expected
increase in the plant’s profit from misreporting, while keeping the plant’s expected utility constant.
This benefits the risk-neutral distributor. A risk-averse distributor would also benefit, because this
type of misreporting increases the plant’s apparent reliability, reducing the distributor’s exposure to
the spot price. If both parties are risk-neutral, risk allocations do not improve the expected profit,
and a truth-telling contract is optimal.
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The other type of misreporting – reporting down when the plant is up – will expose the distributor
to the spot price risk while the plant earns a random profit. This increases the uncertainties of both
firms’ profits and is generally undesirable.
In general, we show that when the spot price falls into a certain region, misreporting behavior
benefits both parties, but when spot price is not in that region, misreporting should be prohibited. In
practice, the distributor can prohibit undesirable misreporting behavior by imposing a high penalty,
but a clause encouraging misreporting cannot be part of a contract. Thus, we propose using state-
contingent options and prohibiting misreporting. The state-contingent options provide the plant
with the same benefit as it would obtain from misreporting.
The contract gaming in this paper does not involve market manipulation (we assume the plant
does not withhold power from the market). However, we show that contract gaming affects firms’
cash flows and risk profiles, which in turn affect the firms’ competitiveness. Our paper informs the
regulators about the consequences of contract gaming in the unit-contingent contracts and proposes
a method to improve risk allocation. Legal and ethical implications of our findings are discussed
in §8.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. §2 reviews the relevant literature. §3 models the
firms’ interaction as a game with asymmetric information. §4 analyzes the role of misreporting in
risk allocation. §5 extends the analysis to a two-period game. §6 discusses implementation issues
and aggregate risk allocation. §7 presents numerical results. §8 concludes the paper.
2. Related Literature
We apply the theory of Bayesian games originally developed by Harsanyi (1967, 1968a,b) to model
the interactions between the power plant and the distributor. Bayesian games have been applied to
the electricity markets to model the suppliers’ bidding processes in which each power plant’s marginal
cost is private information. Such a game has been analyzed in various market conditions by Ferrero
et al. (1998), Shahidehpour et al. (2002), Li and Shahidehpour (2005), and Correia (2005), among
others. Hortaçsu and Puller (2008) analyze bidding processes in which contract positions are private
information. Unlike previous works, in this paper information asymmetry comes from the fact that
the plant’s status cannot be directly observed by the distributor, and the unit-contingent power
purchase agreement introduces incentive conflicts into the system.
Several economics papers on contract theory are related to our work. For example, Laffont
and Martimort (2002, Section 3.6) discuss an adverse selection problem with audits and costly
state verification. The costly audit allows the principal to detect an untruthful agent’s report and
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impose penalties. The Revelation Principle still applies, and under the truth-revealing mechanisms,
punishments are never used, but the existence of punishments reduces agent’s incentive to lie and,
hence, reduces informational rents. Mookherjee and Png (1989) and Reinganum and Wilde (1985)
apply the adverse selection problems with costly state verification to insurance and taxation. In
contrast to these papers, our analysis is focused on a particular contract form commonly seen in
practice. Because of the restriction on the contract set, instead of invoking the mechanism design
approach (as in Myerson 1981, 1979, Guesnerie and Laffont 1984), we find the equilibrium of the
Bayesian game directly.
Our work shares some similarities to the economics literature on contracting with costly state
verification (e.g., Townsend 1979) and literature on incomplete contracts (e.g., Demski and Sap-
pington 1991, Boot et al. 1993, Bernheim and Whinston 1998) in that by allowing flexibility to
act to one party, a better equilibrium outcome can be achieved. However, there are a number of
essential differences between our work and this literature. For instance, Townsend (1979) and related
economics literature on bonding and insurance are concerned with the problem of signaling private
information: The party with information can initiate a costly verification process, during which part
of the value of the firm is destroyed. In our problem, the firm without information can initiate a
costly inspection to verify the other firm’s report. Papers on incomplete contracts listed above use
models where actions of one of the players are observable, but not contractible (this is the meaning
of “non-verifiable” in their context). In our problem, actions of the plant, other than its report, are
not observable (without an inspection). This is important, because analyses of incomplete contracts
(e.g., Bernheim and Whinston 1998) rely on the second player knowing the actions of the first player
when deciding whether or not to punish her for deviating from the desired equilibrium. Literature
on incomplete contracts studies contracts that are not specified for all states of the world (by choice
or due to non-verifiability). This affords tit-for-tat strategies as in Bernheim and Whinston (1998).
Specifically, the main insight in Bernheim and Whinston (1998) is that if not all actions of the first
player are contractible (but all actions are observable), some of the actions of the second player should
be made non-contractible too (thus introducing strategic ambiguity), so that the second player has
the flexibility of punishing the first player for “shirking”. In contrast, our contract is not strategically
ambiguous. It is fully specified based on all observable information. Thus, although there is some
similarity between our and these economic literatures, the frameworks and the results are different.
Our game is similar to the inspection games used to study problems of arms control and treaty
violations (e.g., Dresher 1962, Diamond 1982, Avenhaus and Canty 2005, among others). The settings
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of these games range from unobservable inspection and simultaneous moves (Diamond 1982) to
observable inspection and sequential moves (Avenhaus and Canty 2005). Our problem differs from
the inspection games in two aspects. First, the players’ payoffs in our problem depend on both a
publicly observable stochastic process and an inspectee’s private information process. The inspectee’s
incentive to violate depends on both processes, while the inspector’s incentive to inspect depends
on the public signal and the inspectee’s report. Second, in our setting, before the game begins, the
inspector offers a contract to the inspectee that affects players’ incentives during the game.
Examples of inspection games in procurement are Reyniers and Tapiero (1995a,b), who study
static quality-inspection games where the seller chooses product quality (unobservable by the buyer)
and the buyer decides whether to inspect the product. They find non-cooperative and cooperative
mixed strategy equilibria of the quality-inspection games. Reyniers and Tapiero (1995a) also design
a contract that leads to a cooperative equilibrium.
Heese and Kemahlioglu-Ziya (2010) study the misreporting of revenues by a retailer in a revenue-
sharing contract between a supplier and the retailer, who enjoys private information about demand.
Although the motivation of their research and the contracts considered are different from our paper,
some results are similar: Heese and Kemahlioglu-Ziya (2010) also find that it might be beneficial to
limit cheating by the retailer, but not eliminate it altogether.
3. Unit-Contingent Contract and Subsequent Inspection Game
A distributor buys electricity from a plant on a unit-contingent basis. The plant has two states: UP
and DOWN (denoted in capital letters for visual convenience). In the UP state the plant produces
power at its full capacity, which we normalize to be one unit, and the production cost is denoted
as c . In the DOWN state the plant cannot produce anything. The two-status model is a reasonable
approximation (e.g., in the example shown in appendix A, the plant’s output falls between 0% and
90% of its capacity for only 5% of the time). The distributor sells the energy to satisfy a firm
contract with a fixed price f . Unit-contingent contracts are often used for base-load plants, and the
firm service contracts are part of the base-load.
The timeline of the interactions between the distributor and the plant is illustrated in Figure 1.
During the contracting stage, the distributor determines the contract parameters, which consist of a
pair of functions: (v(p), φ(p)), where p is the spot price to be realized in the contract execution stage,
v(p) > 0 is the unit-contingent contract price (i.e., the payment from the distributor to the plant if
the realized spot price is p and the plant delivers electricity to the distributor; otherwise, no payment
is made), and φ(p) ≥ 0 is the penalty paid by the plant to the distributor if the plant is found to
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have misreported its status. In practice, unit-contingent contract prices are typically independent
of the spot price, i.e., v(p) = v. The main insights hold regardless of whether the contract price
is constant or dependent on the spot price. For a discussion on the importance of connecting the
long-term contract prices with spot prices see Boyabatlı et al. (2011).


































In this section, the contract execution stage is modeled as a single-period inspection game. Con-
tract execution in a multi-period setting will be analyzed in §5 and §6. The differences between our
game and the inspection games in the literature are reviewed in the previous section.
Nature’s move: During the execution stage, it is common knowledge that nature lets the plant
to be UP with probability γ ∈ (0, 1) and DOWN with probability 1− γ. The plant’s actual status is
its private information. Nature also determines the spot price, p, based on the supply and demand
balance in the market. It is common knowledge that the spot price follows a continuous distribution
with probability density function g(p), and the realized spot price is public information. We assume
that the power generating unit is small so that its status has negligible influence on the distribution
of the spot price.
Plant’s move: Based on its realized status, the plant schedules with the ISO (system operator)
and supplies energy to the grid if UP. The plant is prohibited to misreport to the ISO (see appendix B
for regulations). After observing the realized spot price, the plant reports a status to the distributor.
In practice, the price and status uncertainties are resolved when the plant reports its status. (See
appendix B for more details on contract execution in practice and why the system operator protects
the plant’s private information from being accessible to the distributor.)
Distributor’s move: The distributor schedules with the ISO and withdraws energy from the
grid to meet its firm contract obligation. (The distributor cannot tell where the energy is actually
produced.) After receiving the plant’s status report, the distributor may inspect the truthfulness of
the the plant’s report at an inspection cost k > 0, which involves administrative cost and legal fees
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for access to the plant’s internal records or its account at the system operator.
Table 1: Profits from Contract Execution
In each formula cell, the top expression is the plant’s profit, the bottom expression is the distributor’s profit.
Nature determines the plant’s status
UP DOWN
Plant reports Plant reports




f − v(p)− k
v(p)− c− φ(p)
f − v(p)− k + φ(p)
−φ(p)
f − p− k + φ(p)
0











Given the moves by nature, the plant, and the distributor, the profits (or losses) of both firms
are summarized in Table 1. For example, when the plant is UP but reports DOWN, if the distributor
does not inspect, the plant earns a profit of p − c (selling its output on the spot market), while the
distributor’s profit is f − p (buying on the spot market to cover its firm contract). If the distributor
inspects (at cost k), misreporting will be uncovered, and the cash flows are then corrected based on
the true status (the plant effectively pays compensatory damages); furthermore, the plant must pay
the punitive damages φ(p) specified in the contract. In practice, both penalties are specified in some
contracts (see, e.g., Bachrach et al. 2003).
The spot price is set by the marginal generating unit on the grid and, therefore, is typically
higher than the production cost c of a base-load plant. The spot price may sporadically drop below
the production cost c, but the plant continues production due to high switching cost. Thus, when
the plant is UP, it always produces energy at cost c.
The payoffs of the game are expressed as the utilities of the profits given in Table 1. In the
multi-period settings in §5 and §6, the utility will be on the aggregate profit over multiple periods.
The utility functions of the plant and the distributor are UP (·) and UD(·), respectively. We assume
(i) both utility functions are concave and strictly increasing, (ii) UP (0) = 0, and (iii) UD(x) → ∞ as
x → ∞. The last two assumptions are not crucial for the results, but help with the exposition.
3.1 Bayesian Equilibrium of the Inspection Game
In this section, we find the Bayesian equilibrium of the execution stage game for any given contract
(v(p), φ(p)) ≥ 0 and any given realization of the spot price p. The mixed strategies of the plant and
the distributor are characterized by the following probabilities:
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xU = Probability that the plant tells the truth (i.e., reports UP) when it is UP;
xD = Probability that the plant tells the truth (i.e., reports DOWN) when it is DOWN;
yU = Probability that the distributor inspects if the plant reports UP;
yD = Probability that the distributor inspects if the plant reports DOWN.
How the game is played depends on whether the spot price p is higher or lower than the unit-
contingent contract price v(p), and in the case of p > v(p), it further depends on whether the penalty
is above or below the following threshold:
φ̂(p)
def







UD(f − p− k)
)
, for p > v(p). (1)





< k. When the distributor inspects, the expected compensation to the distributor




, because φ(p)+p−v(p) is the total payment that the plant compen-
sates the distributor if misreporting DOWN is found, and P
{





≤ γ. Therefore, if γ
(
φ(p) + p− v(p)
)
< k, the expected compensation from inspection
cannot cover the inspection cost and the distributor will not conduct an inspection.
For a risk-averse distributor, φ(p) < φ̂(p) is equivalent to γUD(f−v(p)−k+φ(p))+(1−γ)UD(f−
p− k) < UD(f − p), where the left side is the distributor’s maximum expected utility if it inspects a
DOWN report, and the right side is the distributor’s expected utility if it does not inspect. Hence,
the distributor will not conduct an inspection when the penalty φ(p) is below the threshold φ̂(p).
The Bayesian equilibrium under p > v(p) is summarized in the following proposition, with the
proof relegated to the online supplement.
Proposition 1a When the spot price is above the contract price, p > v(p), the Bayesian equilibrium
of the contract execution stage game is as follows:
(i) If the penalty φ(p) does not exceed the threshold φ̂(p) defined in (1), we have a pooling equilibrium









= 0), and the equilibrium utilities of the plant and the distributor are:
E[UP | p] = γUP (p− c), E[UD | p] = UD(f − p). (2)
(ii) If φ(p) > φ̂(p), we have a mixed strategy equilibrium:
x∗
U
= 1− (1− γ)α̂
γ(1− α̂) , where α̂ =
UD(f − p)− UD(f − p− k)





UP (p − c)− UP (v(p) − c)





= 1, and y∗
U
= 0. The firms’ equilibrium utilities are:
E[UP | p] = γUP (v(p)− c), E[UD | p] = γx∗UUD(f − v(p)) + (1− γx∗U)UD(f − p). (3)
Note that the firms’ expected utilities in (3) do not directly involve the penalty. This is because
the plant balances gains from misreporting and losses due to penalty, while the distributor balances
the cost and benefit of inspection. In the resulting equilibrium, the plant’s expected utility is the same
whether it misreports or reports truthfully; the distributor’s expected utility is the same whether it
inspects or not. Note that the distributor uses the penalty to influence the equilibrium misreporting
probability x∗
U
, which in turn affects the distributor’s expected utility.
Figure 2 illustrates a few useful properties of the above equilibrium. When the plant is UP, the
probability of truthful reporting increases in the penalty φ(p) and approaches to one as φ(p) → ∞.
If the plant reports DOWN and φ(p) > φ̂(p), the distributor may conduct an inspection and the
probability of inspection, ŷD, decreases in φ(p) and approaches zero when φ(p) → ∞. Intuitively, a
very large penalty with a very small inspection probability can effectively deter misreporting. When
the penalty φ(p) increases, the plant’s expected utility decreases (in a step-function fashion, see
Figure 2) and the distributor’s expected utility increases.
Figure 2: Effect of Penalty φ(p) on Equilibrium Strategies and Utilities
Parameters: γ = 0.8, k = 8, p = 75, v(p) = 70, UD(x) = x, φ̂(p) = v(p)− p+ k/γ = 5

















































When the spot price p is below the contract price v(p), the analysis is in parallel and we summarize
the equilibrium below. The penalty threshold is
φ̂(p)
def
= p+ k − f + U−1D
(
1
1− γUD(f − v(p))−
γ
1− γUD(f − v(p)− k)
)
, for p < v(p). (4)
The Bayesian equilibrium under p < v(p) is summarized in the following proposition.
Proposition 1b When the spot price is below the contract price, p < v(p), the Bayesian equilibrium
of the contract execution stage game is as follows:
(i) If the penalty φ(p) does not exceed the threshold φ̂(p) defined in (4), we have a pooling equilibrium









0), and the equilibrium utilities of the plant and the distributor are:
E[UP | p] = γUP (v(p) − c) + (1− γ)UP (v(p) − p), E[UD | p] = UD(f − v(p)). (5)
(ii) If φ(p) > φ̂(p), we have a mixed strategy equilibrium:
x∗D = 1−
γβ̂
(1− γ)(1 − β̂)
, where β̂ =
UD(f − v(p))− UD(f − v(p)− k)
UD(f − p− k + φ(p)) − UD(f − v(p)− k)
,
y∗U =
UP (v(p) − p)




= 1, and y∗
D
= 0. The firms’ equilibrium utilities are:
E[UP | p] = γUP (v(p)− c), E[UD | p] = (1− (1− γ)x∗D)UD(f − v(p)) + (1− γ)x∗DUD(f − p). (6)
4. Misreporting as a Risk Allocation Mechanism
Anticipating the equilibrium in the execution stage game, the distributor now chooses the contract
parameters (v(p), φ(p)) to influence the plant’s misreporting behavior. Assume the plant’s reservation
utility is UP > 0 (recall UP (0) = 0). The distributor’s utility-maximization problem is:
max
{v(p), φ(p)}
E[UD], s.t. E[UP ] ≥ UP . (7)
Because we are analyzing a specific type of contract, the unit-contingent contract, we look for the
optimal contract based on the explicit solution to the Bayesian game derived in the previous section,
rather than taking the general mechanism design approach. In fact, general mechanism design
leads to an impractical contract: Let v(p,UP) and v(p,DOWN) be the distributor’s payment to the
plant which reports UP and DOWN, respectively. The incentive compatibility requires v(p,UP) −
v(p,DOWN) = p for all p, because if this equality were < (or >), it would provide incentive for
misreporting DOWN (or UP). Any contract satisfying this equality exposes the plant to the spot
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price risk (outage leads to a payment reduction of p) and, therefore, does not possess the key feature
of the unit-contingent contract.
4.1 Unit-Contingent Truth-Telling Contracts
We first analyze the unit-contingent contracts that enforce truth-telling. From the analysis in §3.1,
we see that truth-telling is the equilibrium outcome when the penalty for misreporting is infinite
in theory, but as shown in Figure 2, the truth-telling probability approaches to one quickly and
the distributor’s expected utility converges quickly when the penalty increases. Thus, a reasonably
large penalty is sufficient to deter misreporting. For analytical tractability, we approximate the
distributor’s expected utility under a large penalty by its expected utility under infinite penalty.




= 1. Therefore, (3)
and (6) imply that the firms’ expected utilities are:
E[UP ] = γEUP (v(p)− c), E[UD] = γEUD(f − v(p)) + (1− γ)EUD(f − p). (8)
Solving the problem in (7) with E[UP ] and E[UD] defined in (8) gives the following lemma.
Lemma 1 The contract (v(p) = v0, φ(p) = ∞) with v0 satisfying γUP (v0 − c) = UP is optimal
among all unit-contingent truth-telling contracts.
Intuitively, when truth-telling is enforced, bilateral transactions occur only when the plant is up, and
a constant contract price stabilizes both parties’ income when the plant is up.
Note that the truth-telling contract in Lemma 1 is optimal among all contracts when both parties
are risk-neutral. This is because when truth-telling is enforced, costly inspections will not occur.
Therefore, the sum of both firms’ expected profit is maximized, and keeping the plant’s profit at its
reservation level maximizes the distributor’s expected profit.
4.2 Sub-Optimality of the Unit-Contingent Truth-Telling Contracts
If truth-telling is enforced, v0 is the lowest contract price the plant is willing to accept, but is there a
better contract with v < v0 and a lower penalty? We consider a contract (v(p), φ(p)) of the following
form:




0, p ∈ [v − δ, v],
∞, otherwise,
(9)
where v is slightly below v0 and δ is small (we assume δ ∈ (0, k), where k is the inspection cost).
Under the contract in (9), when the spot price p ∈ [v − δ, v], the equilibrium in Proposition 1b(i) is
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played.1 In this equilibrium, facing zero penalty for misreporting, the plant would report UP when
it is DOWN, obtaining a profit of v − p. Because of this benefit, the plant is willing to accept a
contract price v < v0. When p 6∈ [v − δ, v], the equilibrium is that in Proposition 1a(ii) or that in





The following proposition shows that a contract of the form (9) can allocate the risk between the
two parties more efficiently than the truth-telling enforcing contract.
Proposition 2a If either the plant or the distributor or both are risk-averse, then there exists a
unit-contingent contract of the form (9) that strictly dominates the truth-telling enforcing contract
(v0, φ(·) = ∞), i.e., strictly improves E[UD] in (7) while holding E[UP ] constant.
Intuitively, a lower contract price v < v0 reduces the plant’s profit when the plant is UP, resulting
in a utility loss of γUP (v0 − c)− γUP (v − c). To compensate for this loss, the distributor eliminates
the misreporting penalty when the spot price p ∈ [v − δ, v]. When the spot price falls in this
range, the DOWN plant can still gain a small profit, v − p, by purchasing electricity on the spot




UP (v−p)g(p)dp = γUP (v0− c)−γUP (v− c), thereby keeping the plant’s expected utility




is smaller than the expected loss γ(v0 − v). Hence, the distributor’s expected profit increases.
Furthermore, the distributor now enjoys more certain profit: It obtains a fixed profit of f −v (higher
than f − v0) with a higher probability than under the truth-telling enforcing contract.
We remark that when a plant reports UP when DOWN, it buys electricity from the spot market
and sells to the distributor. Such a transaction can be easily executed because it is exactly what
the plant has to do during the outages under a firm contract. Furthermore, the opportunities of
misreporting UP when DOWN are not rare, because outages are not rare and the unit-contingent
contract price is typically close to the median spot price.
An important implication of Proposition 2a is that the seemingly undesirable action of the plant’s
reporting UP when DOWN could actually serve as a tacit risk-allocation mechanism between the plant
and the distributor. A natural question is whether plant’s reporting DOWN when UP could also serve
the same purpose. Consider a contract (v(p), φ(p)) that steers the plant to misreport DOWN when
1 To see this, note that φ̂(p) defined in (4) satisfies
UD(f − v) − UD(f − v − k)
UD(f − p− k + φ̂(p)) − UD(f − v − k)
= 1− γ < 1, which implies
that φ̂(p) > p + k − v. Thus, for p ∈ [v − δ, v] and δ < k, we have φ̂(p) > k − δ > 0. Hence, φ̂(p) > φ(p) = 0 for
p ∈ [v − δ, v], which satisfies the condition in Proposition 1b(i).
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UP for spot price p ∈ [v, v + δ]:




0, p ∈ [v, v + δ],
∞, otherwise.
(10)
Proposition 2b If either the plant or the distributor or both are risk-averse, then the unit-contingent
contract of the form (10) is strictly dominated by the truth-telling enforcing contract.
Intuitively, a truthful report of UP provides both firms with a fixed profit, whereas misreporting
DOWN introduces additional variability to both parties’ profits (the plant sells its output to the spot
market and the distributor buys replacement power at the spot price). Thus, the contract in (10)
performs worse than the truth-telling contracts. However, optimal contracts may contain both types
of misreporting, because allowing misreporting DOWN would reduce the contract price v, which
might affect the plant’s extra profit obtained from misreporting UP.
4.3 Optimal Unit-Contingent Contracts
We first make the following observation based on Proposition 1 and Figure 2.
Corollary 1 A unit-contingent contract (v(p), φ(p)) with penalty φ(p) < ∞ is strictly dominated by
the contract (v(p), φ†(p)), where φ†(p) = 0 if φ(p) ≤ φ̂(p), and φ†(p) > φ(p) if φ(p) > φ̂(p).
From Figure 2, it can be seen that (v(p), φ†(p)) defined in Corollary 1 will not change the plant’s
expected utility, but increase the distributor’s expected utility. Intuitively, when the penalty is above
the threshold, a higher penalty leads to higher truth-telling probability, benefiting the distributor.
Corollary 1 implies that, without loss of optimality, we can restrict our attention to only two penalty
values: zero and very high penalty.
With the above observation, choosing a contract (v(p), φ(p)) is equivalent to choosing a contract
price function v(p) and a price set L, within which the penalty is zero and beyond which the penalty
is very high. Because there is no incentive for misreporting when p = v(p), we can exclude the set
{p : p = v(p)} from L. Let L = Ll ∪ Lr, where
Ll
def
= { p : p < v(p), φ(p) = 0 }, Lr def= { p : p > v(p), φ(p) = 0 }.
From Corollary 1, zero penalty is never optimal when the threshold φ̂(p) < 0. Thus, the two subsets
above must be contained in the region where the threshold is non-negative:
Ll ⊆ Sl def= { p : p < v(p), φ̂(p) ≥ 0 }, Lr ⊆ Sr def= { p : p > v(p), φ̂(p) ≥ 0 }. (11)
We refer to Ll and Lr as zero-penalty regions and Sl and Sr as zero-penalty feasible regions.
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Using Proposition 1, we can derive the firms’ expected utilities. When p ∈ Ll, the equilibrium
utilities are given in (5):
E[UP | p] = γUP (v(p) − c) + (1− γ)UP (v(p) − p), E[UD | p] = UD(f − v(p)).
When p ∈ Lr, the equilibrium utilities are given in (2):
E[UP | p] = γUP (p− c), E[UD | p] = UD(f − p).
When p 6∈ (Ll ∪ Lr), it is optimal for the distributor to set penalty φ(p) = ∞. Both (3) and (6)
imply that:
E[UP | p] = γUP (v(p) − c), E[UD | p] = γUD(f − v(p)) + (1− γ)UD(f − p).
Integrating utilities over the above three price regions and rearranging terms, we can express the
firms’ expected utilities as follows:



























UD(f − v(p))− UD(f − p)
]
g(p)dp. (13)
In (12), the first term γEUP (v(p)− c) is the plant’s expected utility if it always reports the true
status, and the other two terms are the additional utility the plant can get by misreporting its status
in the zero-penalty regions Ll and Lr, respectively. In (13), the first term in the brackets is the
distributor’s expected utility when the plant is truthful, and the remaining two integrals account for
the utility loss due to the plant’s misreporting behavior.
Using (12) and (13), the distributor’s problem in (7) now becomes:
max
{v(p), Li⊆Si, i=l,r}
E[UD], s.t. E[UP ] ≥ UP . (14)
Solving the optimization problem in (14) is complicated in general, but we are able to identify some
structural properties of the optimal contracts, as detailed in Proposition 3 and illustrated in Figure 3.
Proposition 3 Suppose either the plant or the distributor or both are risk-averse. Then, the optimal
contract (v∗(p), L∗l , L
∗
r) has the following structural properties:
a. Properties of the contract price v∗(p):
(i) v∗(p) is constant outside of the zero-penalty regions: v∗(p) = v1, for some v1 and p 6∈ L∗l ∪ L∗r.
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(ii) If the plant is risk-averse, v∗(p) increases in p for p ∈ L∗l at a rate no faster than one, and
v∗(p) ≥ v1 for p ∈ L∗l ∩ [c,∞). If the plant is risk-neutral, v∗(p) = v1 for p ∈ L∗l .
b. Properties of L∗l and L
∗
r:
(i) If L∗r 6= ∅, then L∗r is to the right of L∗l , i.e., pl < pr, ∀pl ∈ L∗l , pr ∈ L∗r.




l ,∞) ∩ Sl for
some p∗l . If the plant is risk-neutral, then L
∗
l is on the leftmost part of Sl: L
∗
l = [0, p
∗
l ] ∩ Sl for
some p∗l .
(iii) L∗r is on the leftmost part of Sr: L
∗
r = [0, p
∗
r ] ∩ Sr for some p∗r.
(iv) If we restrict the contract price to be invariant with the spot price, i.e., v(p) = v, ∀p, then all
structural properties of L∗l and L
∗
r in parts (i)-(iii) still hold. In addition, Sl is an interval and,
if one of the firms is risk-neutral, L∗l is an interval.
Figure 3: Structural Properties of the Optimal Unit-Contingent Contract
The case of risk-averse plant and risk-neutral distributor
Property a(i) shows that in the price region where misreporting is prohibited (p 6∈ Ll ∪ Lr), it
is optimal to use a fixed contract price, because it stabilizes both firms’ income when the plant is
UP. When the price falls into the zero-penalty region Ll, the plant would report UP when DOWN to
earn a profit of v(p)− p, and the plant gets v(p)− c when it is actually UP. For a risk-averse plant,
to reduce the plant’s income variability, intuitively the distributor can select v(p) so that the above
incomes, v(p) − p and v(p) − c, change mildly with p. This can be achieved if v(p) increases in p
at a rate no faster than one, which is exactly what part a(ii) prescribes. Note that for p ∈ L∗r, any
v(p) < p is fine; no particular structure is necessary.
Property b(i) can be intuitively explained: If Lr is not to the right of Ll, then we would find
pl ∈ Ll and pr ∈ Lr such that v(pr) < pr < pl < v(pl), which implies v(pl) − v(pr) > pl − pr, i.e.,
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v(p) changes faster than the price changes. Such v(p) is unlikely to be the best for stabilizing either
firm’s income.
For most settings, Sl and Sr are intervals and, consequently, properties b(ii) and b(iii) imply that
L∗l and L
∗
r are also intervals. A typical optimal contract is illustrated in Figure 3.
We intuitively explain properties b(ii) and b(iii) under a fixed contract price v. (Part (iv) states
that those properties hold when v(p) ≡ v.) Property b(ii) shows that if a risk-neutral distributor
chooses to induce a risk-averse plant to report UP when DOWN to gain a profit of v − p, then p
should be as large as possible. Intuitively, the risk-averse plant prefers high-probability small gains
(corresponding to high p in the region p < v) over low-probability large gains (corresponding to
low p) with the same expected value. Thus, by shifting the zero-penalty region Ll as close to v as
possible, the distributor can lower the plant’s expected gains from misreporting, thereby improving
the distributor’s expected profit while keeping the plant’s expected utility constant. The intuition
for the property of L∗r in b(iii) is similar.
In reality, in terms of firm size, distributors are often much larger than plants. Thus, for a unit-
contingent contract, we can consider the distributor is risk-neutral and the plant is risk-averse. Small
distributors and large plants do exist, and the second statement in part b(ii) states that a risk-averse
distributor who is contracting with a risk-neutral plant will try to move the zero-penalty region Ll
to the left of the feasible region Sl. Intuitively, by inducing the plant to report UP when DOWN,
the distributor essentially sacrifices a random profit of v − p in return for a lower contract price v
and lower profit variability (note that the risk-neutral plant’s expected profit is held constant, so
is the distributor’s expected profit). To minimize the profit variability, the risk-averse distributor
prefers sacrificing low-probability large profit (corresponding to low spot prices) over sacrificing high-
probability small profit.
In practice, constant unit-contingent contract price is prevalent. Our analysis shows that the
optimal contract contains non-constant contract price in some price region while a constant price
in other regions. However, specifying the contract price as a function of the price is not easily
implementable in practice. In the analysis of a two-period model in §5 and a multi-period model in
§6, we focus on constant contract price.
5. Two-Period Interaction and Risk Allocation
In this section, we describe the main results from analyzing a two-period model. The analysis of the
two-period game involves many technical details. A technical note is available upon request to the
authors.
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In the two-period model, the second period has the same sequence of events as in the single-
period model. The two periods are linked in three ways: a) The firms’ utilities are derived on the
sum of cash flows in both periods; b) The penalty can be history-dependent, e.g., higher penalty on
double misreports; c) Inspection in the second period detects misreports in both periods. These three
aspects capture the reality: Firms typically care about profit and loss aggregated over an accounting
period; penalty for repeated misreports tends to be more severe; inspection cost is a function of the
effort, not the length of the data obtained.
Recall that in a single-period game, two types of misreports can happen:
Type 1: Plant reports rt = U when its status is st = D and pt < v;
Type 2: Plant reports rt = D when its status is st = U and pt > v.
In a two-period game, two more types of misreports that benefit the distributor are possible:
Type 3: Plant reports rt = D when its status is st = U and pt < v;
Type 4: Plant reports rt = U when its status is st = D and pt > v.
In a single-period game analyzed in §3, types 3 and 4 misreports are dominated strategies for the
plant. Therefore, there is no need to consider them. However, in a two-period game, types 3 and 4
misreports may benefit the strategic plant in some circumstances. Because type 3 and 4 misreports
benefit the distributor, we assume that there is no penalty for them.
In a perfect Bayesian equilibrium, we show that type 3 and 4 misreports can occur in the fol-
lowing situation. When the plant already misreported in the first period and the penalty on double
misreports is high, the plant could make a type 3 or 4 misreport to the distributor in the second
period, which indicates that it did not make double misreports of type 1 or 2. This reduces or
eliminates the distributor’s incentive to inspect and allows the plant to keep the misreporting benefit
from the first period.
Our analysis also shows that whenever a penalty is imposed, a higher penalty level benefits
both firms by raising both firms’ expected utilities. As the penalty level increases, the inspection
probability goes to zero. Because the inspection probability diminishes, the aforementioned benefit
of type 3 or 4 misreport shrinks as well. In fact, we show that under very high penalty, type 3 or 4
misreport will no longer occur.
A more important strategic behavior present in the two-period model is that the plant may choose
to give up the benefit from misreporting in the first period, so that it reserves the opportunity of
misreporting in the second period without being penalized for double misreports. Such a strategy
is desirable when the penalty on double misreports is high and the benefit from the first-period
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misreport is small. In our technical report, we rigorously derive conditions under which such strategic
behavior will be played in the equilibrium.
Interestingly, through extensive numerical comparison of various contract structures, we show
that an extra penalty on double misreports is undesirable for risk allocation, because it induces the
plant to give up small benefits in the first period, and the single-period analysis tells us that small
benefits allocated to the risk-averse plant are beneficial for risk allocation between the two parties.
In short, our analysis on the two-period game conclude that although richer strategic interactions
between the contractual parties exist in the two-period game, they do not improve the risk allocation
between the firms; employing the same penalty structure for both periods appears to be the best for
risk allocation. The implication for a multi-period game is that a more complicated penalty structure
may induce strategic behaviors that are undesirable for risk allocation.
6. Implementation Issues and Risk Allocation in Multiple Periods
In this section, we discuss how the misreporting problem can be managed in practice, and further
study a multi-period model to analyze aggregate risk allocation. In this multi-period model, the
same penalty structure (v, Ll, Lr) studied in §4.3 is used in every period. From the analysis of the
two-period model in §5, we know that a more complicated penalty structure may induce strategic
behaviors that are not desirable for risk allocation.
6.1 Implementation of the Optimal Contract
In practice, “no penalty for misreporting” cannot be the type of language used in any contract. How
should the distributor write the contract to manage the plant’s misreporting behavior? Recognizing
that the purpose of the zero penalty is to give extra benefits to the plant in certain circumstances,
the distributor can specify those extra benefits in the contract while prohibit misreporting.
Specifically, any unit-contingent contract with constant contract price v and zero-penalty regions
Ll and Lr can be implemented as a portfolio of the following three components:
1. A unit-contingent contract with price v and very high penalty for misreporting (effectively
prohibiting plant’s misreporting).
2. A put option to the plant with strike price v, which can be exercised only when the plant
reports down and p ∈ Ll. The value of this option upon exercising is v − p.
3. A call option to the plant with strike price v, which can be exercised only when the plant
reports up and p ∈ Lr. The value of this option upon exercising is p− v.
In the above portfolio, the put and call options are state-contingent and provide the plant with
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the same benefit as having the zero-penalty regions Ll and Lr. The option premia are already
factored in the contract price, so no upfront payment is necessary.
In the analysis in §4.3, Li (i = l, r) must be contained in the feasible region Si defined in (11),
because when p falls outside of that region, the benefit of misreporting |v−p| is large and, even if the
penalty is zero, the distributor may still inspect to prevent the plant from getting the large benefit
|v− p|. However, in the call and put options specified above, Li is simply the price region where the
distributor commits to pay |v − p| to the plant that is in a certain status. Hence, Li does not have
to be contained in Si. Nevertheless, a good power purchase agreement should provide the plant with
an incentive to maintain its reliability. An Ll that contains a range of low prices would mean that
the plant may get a large benefit even if it is DOWN, which reduces the incentive for maintaining
reliability.
For the rest of this paper, we assume that Ll is at least above the plant’s production cost c, so
that a DOWN plant never obtains a profit larger than v − c. Let S̃l = [p, v], p ≥ c and S̃r = [v,∞)
denote the feasible regions for exercising the options. Because S̃l and S̃r are intervals, Proposition 3
b(ii) and b(iii) imply that L∗l and L
∗
r are also intervals. Proposition 4 identifies an additional property
of the optimal contract under general utility functions for both firms.
Proposition 4 Consider solving (14) with v(p) ≡ v and Si replaced by S̃i. If L∗l is strictly contained
in S̃l, then L
∗
r = ∅.
Proposition 4 essentially says if the portfolio contains a call option (L∗r 6= ∅), then it must contain
a put option whose exercise region cannot be further expanded (i.e., L∗l = S̃l).
6.2 Multi-Period Contract Execution and Aggregate Risk Allocation
In practice, the execution of the unit-contingent contract lasts for many periods (thousands of periods
typically). Both firms derive utilities from aggregate income over several months or years, and are
concerned about the aggregate risk allocation.
If the firms’ profits were independent across all periods, then improving the risk allocation in
each period would be equivalent to improving the aggregate risk allocation. This is not the case in
practice, where a period is an hour and profits in adjacent hours are correlated. In this section, we
quantify the variability of the total profit over many periods and analyze aggregate risk allocation.
We consider contracts that have constant contract price and structural properties in Propositions 3
and 4, and contract parameters do not change over multi-period execution. As discussed in §6.1,
such contracts are straightforward to implement in practice. Finding the optimal contract with those
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structural properties is already non-trivial, as we will see below.
Assume the contract execution stage comprises N periods. The spot price process and the plant’s
status process are assumed to have stationary distributions. Let us redefine g(p) as the stationary
distribution of the spot price, and redefine γ as the long-run fraction of time that plant is UP. Let
πP and πD be random variables representing the long-run stationary distribution of the single-period
profit for the plant and the distributor, respectively.
Let ΠP and ΠD denote respectively the plant’s and distributor’s total profits over N periods.
Because N is typically large in practice, we employ normal approximation for ΠP and ΠD. We apply
the Central Limit Theorem for dependent random variables (Billingsley 1995, p. 363) because profits
are serially correlated. Let the profit sequences be {πP1, πP2, . . . } and {πD1, πD2, . . . }. For ease of
exposition, assume πP1 and πD1 have stationary distributions (πP1
dist
= πP , πD1
dist
= πD) and both
sequences are stationary. Then, we have the following relations:
N−1E[ΠP ] = E[πP ], N
−1
Var[ΠP ] → Var[πP ] + 2
∞∑
k=1
Cov(πP1, πP,1+k), N → ∞, (15)
N−1E[ΠD] = E[πD], N
−1
Var[ΠD] → Var[πD] + 2
∞∑
k=1
Cov(πD1, πD,1+k), N → ∞. (16)
The relations in (15)-(16) highlight that serial correlations of the profits contribute to the ag-
gregate profit variability. Reducing the single-period profit variance, Var[πP ] and Var[πD], only
represents part of the total variance reduction. Do serial correlations also decline at the same time?
Intuitively, if we reduce the profit variability in each period, serial correlations are likely to decrease
as well – at least this is true if variability is reduced to zero.
Unfortunately but interestingly, for our problem serial correlations may sometimes increase faster
than the decline in the single-period profit variance and, therefore, caution must be taken in analyzing
the aggregate profit variability. Because serial correlations may increase or decrease aggregate profit
variability (depending on how the spot price and plant’s status evolve), we resort to numerical
analysis in the next section to fully reveal the impact of serial correlations. Nevertheless, the following
proposition summarizes some important findings.
Proposition 5 Suppose γ > 1/2 and consider reducing the contract price v and expanding the put
option’s exercise region Ll, while holding Lr = ∅ and keeping E[ΠD] and E[ΠP ] constant. Denote the
lowest possible contract price as v†, at which Ll expands to the entire feasible region, i.e., Ll = S̃l =
[p, v†]. Let πP (v, Ll) and ΠP (v, Ll) denote respectively the plant’s single-period and aggregate profit
under the contract (v, Ll,∅); similar notations apply to the distributor.
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(i) For any v > v† and Ll ⊂ S̃l that satisfy E[ΠP (v, Ll)] = E[ΠP (v†, S̃l)], we have
Var[πP (v, Ll)] > Var[πP (v
†, S̃l)] and Var[πD(v, Ll)] > Var[πD(v
†, S̃l)]. (17)
(ii) When v decreases,
∞∑
k=1
Cov(πP1, πP,1+k) may change in the opposite direction to the changes in
Var[πP ] and, consequently, we may have
Var[ΠP (v, Ll)] < Var[ΠP (v
†, S̃l)], for some v > v
†.
Proposition 5(i) essentially says that whenever the put option’s exercise region Ll is strictly
smaller than the feasible region S̃l = [p, v], we can reduce both firms’ single-period profit variability
without changing the average profit by lowering v to v† and setting Ll = S̃l.
If the inequalities in (17) could also hold for serial correlations, then from (15)-(16), any contract
with v > v† would not minimize the total profit variability. However, Proposition 5(ii) shows that the
serial correlations may sometimes increase faster than the decline in the single-period profit variance.
7. Numerical Analysis
In this section, we simulate the firms’ profit streams under various contracts of the form proposed in
§6.1, quantify the profit variability, and identify superior risk allocations.
We run a 5,000-period simulation. We assume that the logarithm of the spot price follows a
mean-reverting process:
d log(pt) = η(m− log(pt))dt+ σdWt, m = 4.2, η = 0.3, σ = 0.387.
We let the initial price have the same distribution as the long-run stationary distribution. Thus, at
any time t, log(pt) has a mean of 4.2 and a standard deviation of σ/
√
2η = 0.5; hence, the average
price is $75.57/MWh. (The logarithm of the spot price at the PJM hub in July-August 2008 has a
mean of 4.2 and a standard deviation of 0.5, estimated using the hourly price data.)
The plant’s capacity is assumed to be 100 MW. Its status changes in a Markovian fashion: Being
UP this period, it will be UP the next period with a probability of 0.95; being DOWN this period, it
will return to UP the next period with a probability of 0.2. It can be calculated that the long-run
fraction of time that the plant is up is γ = 0.8 (see http://www.nerc.com/page.php?cid=4|43|47 for
statistics on generating unit availability). The production cost is c = $30/MWh (average operating
cost of fossil steam engines is $29.59/MWh, reported by Energy Information Administration 2007).
The distributor’s firm contract price is f = $80/MWh (PJM futures for 2008 summer electricity
were traded around $80/MWh in 2005; data available from Bloomberg).
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Our numerical procedure can be used to find the optimal contract under specific utility functions.
But a much more appealing way to demonstrate improvement in risk allocation is to compare the
profit distributions under various contracts. Thus, in the following analysis, we do not impose any
specific utility function for either firm, and we focus on comparing firms’ profit variabilities while
keeping the firms’ average profits constant.
Aggregate Profit Distributions under Two Key Contracts
We illustrate the simulation results under the following two important contracts:
Contract A: Unit-contingent contract with contract price v0 = $70/MWh and a high penalty to
deter misreporting.
Contract B: Unit-contingent contract with contract price v = $67.93/MWh and a high penalty
to deter misreporting, and a put option with strike price $67.93/MWh, which can be exercised only
when the plant is down and the spot price is between $30 and $67.93 per MWh, i.e., Ll = S̃l = [c, v].
(The parameters are such that the average profits are the same as in Contract A.)
We ran the simulation 10,000 times. For each simulation run and each contract above, we com-
puted the plant’s and distributor’s total profit over 5,000 hours. The profit distributions under the
two contracts are compared in Figure 4. We can see that normal distribution is a good approximation
for the total profit.
Under Contract A, the plant’s total profit averages at 0.8×($70/MWh−$30/MWh)×100MWh×
Figure 4: Aggregate Profit Distributions
Histograms are generated based on 10,000 simulated paths. Average profits are the same under both
contracts. The plant’s total profit variability (standard deviation) under Contract B is 16% (or $48,000)
lower than that under Contract A. The distributor’s total profit variability under Contract B is 14% (or
$73,000) lower than that under Contract A.
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5000 hours = $16 million. Contract B yields the same average profits for both firms, but it also brings
lower profit variability for both firms: The standard deviations of both firms’ profits are reduced
significantly (around 15% reduction) compared to Contract A.
Impact of Serial Correlation on Total Profit Variability and Contract Choice
We now vary the contract price v in a wider range, adjust the state-contingent options to keep
both firms’ average profit constant, and measure profit variability reduction.
As discussed at the end of §6.1, the state-contingent put option should be used first, and the call
option used only when the put option’s exercise region Ll is equal to the entire feasible region S̃l.
Thus, a kink point is v† = $67.93/MWh, at which Ll = S̃l and Lr = ∅. This contract is exactly
Contract B defined above.
For each contract price v ∈ (v†, v0), we let the put option’s exercise region Ll be in the rightmost
part of S̃l, i.e., Ll = [p1(v), v]. We numerically find the price p1(v) that keeps both firms’ average
profit the same as under Contracts A and B. We also tried moving Ll to the leftmost of S̃l or
anywhere within S̃l, and found similar relations between serial correlation and profit variability.
Figure 5 illustrates the key numerical results. In Figure 5(a), the single-period profit variabilities
(dashed curves) decline for both firms when the contract price v decreases from v0 to v
†, but increase
if v drops below v†. Both firms’ single-period profit variabilities are minimized at v† = $67.93/MWh,
i.e., under Contract B.
In the multi-period setting, other contracts may allocate risk between the two firms better than
Contract B, because serial correlation affects the total profit variability. For the distributor, the
total profit variability (curves with triangular markers) has the same trend as the single-period
profit variability. For the plant, however, serial correlation changes the trend of the total profit
variability (curves with round markers), especially around the kink v†. With low serial correlation
(or high mean-reverting speed, left panel in Figure 5(a)), total profit variability is still minimized
at v†, but that is not the case with medium to high serial correlations. The kink is even reversed
for high serial correlation (right panel Figure 5(a)), because when v decreases, the serial correlation
may change in the opposite direction to the change in single-period variability (Proposition 5(ii)).
An intuitive explanation follows. When v = v0 = $70/MWh, the distributor bears all the spot price
risk during the plant outage period. When v decreases from v0 to v
†, part of that spot price risk is
shifted to the plant. Although this benefits both firms in a single period, the plant’s profit becomes
more strongly tied to the spot price and, therefore, the serial correlation of the plant’s profit increases
and the total profit variability may not decrease (evident in the right panel in Figure 5(a)). When v
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further decreases below v†, the call option needs to be included, and thus even more spot price risk is
shifted to the plant, but the call option’s payoff is negatively correlated with the put option’s payoff,
which reduces the serial correlation, and the plant’s total profit variability may actually decline (seen
in Figure 5(a) middle and right panels).
Figure 5(b) presents the information in Figure 5(a) in a different way to help with contract
selection. We could identify a set of frontier contracts, for which there is no other contract that yields
Figure 5: Impact of Serial Correlation on Total Profit Variability
The total profit variability Var(Π(v)) is calculated based on 10,000 simulated paths. The single-period
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lower profit variabilities for both firms. Depending on the risk appetites of both parties, different
contracts on the frontier can be optimal in terms of risk allocation. For example, in Figure 5(b) right
panel, if the plant is risk-averse and the distributor is risk-neutral, then the contract with v∗ = 68.6
best allocates the risk between the firms. If the distributor is also risk-averse, a different contract on
the frontier would be desirable.
In the above analysis, we held the average profit at the same level as Contracts A and B, but
once both firms’ profit variabilities are reduced, a different average profit might be agreeable. We
can then use the same procedure above to reduce variability under the new average profit level.
8. Conclusions and Extensions
Unit-contingent power supply contracts are widely used in the electricity industry. Because plants
often possess private information about their operational status, the unit-contingent feature may
provide incentives for a plant to misreport its true status. Industry’s default belief is that the plant’s
misreporting reduces the distributor’s profit (for any given contract) and, therefore, the distributor
should either ban misreporting or lower the unit-contingent contract price to compensate for the
losses due to misreporting. Our analysis shows that misreporting can serve as a risk-allocation
mechanism between the plant and the distributor: Plant’s reporting up when being down often
improves risk allocation, whereas reporting down when being up typically impairs risk allocation.
Richer strategic interactions exist in the two-period game, but they do not improve the risk
allocation between the firms; employing the same penalty structure for both periods appears to be
the best for risk allocation. The implication for a multi-period game is that a more complicated
penalty structure may induce strategic behaviors that are undesirable for risk allocation.
Penalty-free misreporting cannot be implemented as a contract clause. Instead, the distributor
can adopt the following approach: prohibit misreporting (via high penalties) but provide the plant
with state-contingent options. The cash flows from the plant’s reporting up when down (down when
up) are equivalent to the payoffs from a put (call) option. In the optimal portfolio, the distributor
always uses the put option, but may or may not use the call option.
When implementing the above portfolio over multiple periods, the impact of serial correlations
of the profits should be taken into account. A higher serial correlation of profit implies a higher total
profit variability over the entire contract execution period. A practical takeaway from considering
serial correlation is that the exercise region of the put (call) option will typically shrink (expand)
because the put (call) option increases (decreases) the serial correlation of the plant’s profit.
Our analysis can be extended in several directions. In practice, electricity distributors manage
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a portfolio of power supply contracts and service contracts. Large distributors may be treated as
risk-neutral entities, and the contracting problem with each plant can be considered separately. For
a risk-averse distributor, the portfolio selection problem should be analyzed using a model that
contains multiple heterogeneous power plants and the distributor’s demand profile (including cus-
tomers’ preferences). The analysis in this paper shows that both the distributor’s and the plant’s
risk can be reduced when the misreporting issue is properly managed. With multiple unit-contingent
contracts with multiple plants, if the contractual terms are similar, cash flows across multiple plants
are positively correlated. Thus, our variance-reduction results will likely to be strengthened in the
context of multiple unit-contingent contracts.
Power plants with multiple generating units may engage different units in different types of
contracts. Concerns arise when a unit under a firm contract is down while another unit under a
unit-contingent contract is running. In such a situation, the plant may wish to shift the output from
the latter unit to satisfy the firm contract obligation first. Such a behavior can be analyzed using the
approach in our paper, because the incentive for shifting the output is the same: The plant has an
incentive to misreport down and shift output only if the spot price (the price of replacement power)
is higher than the unit-contingent contract price.
This paper focuses on managing the incentive problem inherent in the unit-contingent contracts
and the related risk allocation between a distributor and a plant. In addition to the physical contracts,
firms also can use financial contracts to shape their risk profiles. A range of electricity derivatives can
be used to shape market participants’ risk profiles. Deng and Oren (2006) provide an excellent survey
on electricity derivatives and risk management. The payoffs of the financial instruments depend on
market prices that are realized before the plant reports its status, and thus these payoffs become the
initial wealth of the firms at the beginning of the Bayesian game analyzed in the paper. Because the
payoffs of the financial instruments do not depend on the plant status, the proposed state-contingent
options are still beneficial, since they introduce payoffs dependent on the plant status. Thus, the
risk-allocation mechanism analyzed in this paper is important for risk management.
Legal and ethical considerations. Understanding the incentives and consequences of unethical
and unlawful behavior is important for policy-making. In California electricity industry deregulation,
if the incentives and consequences of market manipulation by Enron were foreseeable, the catastrophic
scandal could have been prevented by setting up corresponding market rules. Similarly, if the incen-
tives and consequences of providing bad loans and selling “AAA-rated” mortgage-backed securities
were foreseeable, the financial markets would have been much less chaotic. In our paper, we highlight
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the fact that incentives to misreport exist in a commonly-used electricity-trading contract, point out
how firms would behave in response to those incentives, and discover that the consequence of mis-
reporting in our context is altering the risk allocation between the contractual parties. Specifically,
we find that some forms of misreporting are detrimental, whereas some other types of misreporting
under certain circumstances are beneficial for both the plant and the distributor. However, we do
not advocate any type of misreporting as a business practice, because misreporting of any kind may
violate contract terms and, thus, may be illegal. Furthermore, individuals can be in legal jeopardy
when engaging in illegal activities on behalf of the company. Instead, we recommend the distributor
prohibit misreporting and consider a portfolio consisting of unit-contingent contracts and options.
Such a portfolio allows benefits sharing without a violation of contract terms.
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Appendix
A. Preliminary Investigation of Possible Misreporting
Below we present a preliminary investigation into misreporting behavior based on limited data.
Figure 6 shows the power delivery pattern of a coal-fired power generating unit. The data is hourly.
Figure 6(a) shows the power delivery pattern before the plant was engaged in a unit-contingent con-
tract: When the spot price was above $150/MWh, the unit was producing power at its full capacity
for about 98% of the time. (We could not access the information about the contract type prior to the
unit-contingent contract, but most likely it sold to the spot market prior to that.) Figure 6(b) reveals
that when the same unit was engaged in unit-contingent transactions, less power was delivered to
the distributor at high spot prices. In fact, when the spot price was above $150/MWh, outages
were reported in almost a third of the time. The highlighted data points in Figure 6(b) represent
32 hours of reported outages. The average spot price of these 32 data points was $180/MWh. Sup-
pose the unit-contingent contract was 100 MW at $75/MWh and the distributor had a firm service
contract of 100 MW at $80/MWh. Without those 32 hours of reported outage, the distributor
could have earned ($80 − $75)/MWh × 100 MW × 32 hrs = $16, 000, but instead it suffered a loss
of ($180 − $80)/MWh × 100 MW × 32 hrs = $320, 000. Thus, those 32 hours of reported outage
reduced the distributor’s profit by $336,000 over a four-month period.
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This example does not provide conclusive evidence of misreporting, but it shows the significant
financial impact of misreporting if it occurs.
Figure 6: Electricity Delivery from a Coal-Fired Power Generating Unit
Disclaimer: We do not claim any conclusive evidence that the plant has misreported; the data presented here
is for research purposes only, and should not be used for any other purpose. The data excludes pre-scheduled
maintenance periods.
 (a) Prior to use of unit-contingent contract (b) Under unit-contingent contract 
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B. Related Market Background
This appendix provides information on market regulations and discusses why misreporting behavior
in bilateral contracts is not monitored and cannot be directly observed by the distributor.
There are ten electricity wholesale markets in North America. Each market is organized by
an independent system operator (ISO), a nonprofit organization providing market mechanisms to
coordinate and control the operation of the electrical power system.
Electricity market rules are quite complex. At a high level, the following is the sequence of events
in a unit-contingent contract:
1) The plant and the distributor schedule with the ISO.
2) The plant supplies electricity to the grid, and the distributor withdraws electricity from the
grid. If the plant’s status changes in real-time, it updates the schedule with the ISO.
3) The day after the operating day (or within 1 to 6 days after the operating day, depending on
the contracts), the plant reports to the distributor its status on the operating day. This report is
used to calculate the financial settlement between the plant and the distributor.
4) Actual payment is due on a set day (e.g., the 20th day) of the next month.
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Note that the plant’s report to the distributor, based on which the plant and the distributor settle
their bilateral contracts (over which ISO has no supervision), comes the day after the operating day,
when electricity prices have already been realized.
It is important to note that misreporting to an ISO is prohibited by Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission (FERC), as stated in §5.1.1 and §8.2 of the Market Monitoring and Mitigation Manual of
Midwest ISO (2009). The Manual also details the calculation of penalty charges for the misconduct.
Due to the explicit market regulations and severe consequences, it is reasonable to assume that the
plant always truthfully reports its status to the ISO. On the other hand, the plant reports to the
distributor, because the distributor does not have the right to access the plant’s true status recorded
by the ISO for confidentiality reasons, as stated in §A.4 of the Market Settlements Calculation Guide
of Midwest ISO (2010):
“Determinants are calculation components shown on Settlement Statements that enable verifica-
tion of Charge Types. There are two types of determinants provided on Settlement Statements: 1)
public, and 2) private. ... Private determinants represent confidential participant data related only
to individual participants. Cleared transactions and cleared virtual schedule data are examples of
private determinants. Participants have access to all public data, and only individual private data.
The Midwest ISO provides as many determinants as possible while maintaining each participant’s
confidentiality. ... Although the participant knows their own load volume, they do not have access
to the volume of all other participants individually.”
Furthermore, the ISO only acts as a transmission coordinator needed for the execution of bilateral
contracts. Actually, monitoring bilateral contracts is beyond the ISO’s responsibility, as described
in §3.5 of the Market Monitoring and Mitigation Manual of Midwest ISO (2009):
“MMM (Market Monitoring and Mitigation) is generally concerned with any MP (market par-
ticipant) behavior that affects the competitiveness of the Energy and Operating Reserve Markets
and increases LMPs (Locational Marginal Prices), MCPs (Market Clearing Prices) or ORSGPs
(Offer Revenue Sufficiency Guarantee Payments). The MMM process, however, is not directly
concerned with Internal or External Bilateral Transaction Schedules, with bilateral Capacity, or
with private transmission rights that are not under Midwest ISO administration, unless they affect
the Energy and Operating Reserve Markets and services provided by the Midwest ISO.”
A third party does not exist to monitor or regulate bilateral contracts, e.g., unit-contingent
contracts. In short, the distributor does not have free access to the plant’s private status.
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Proof of Proposition 1a [Bayesian equilibrium for p > v(p)]. If the plant is DOWN, reporting DOWN
(truth-telling) is the dominating strategy for the plant. Therefore, x∗
D
= 1.
If the plant is UP, it obtains UP (v(p) − c) by reporting UP (truth-telling), and an expected utility of
yDUP (v(p)−c−φ(p))+(1−yD)UP (p−c) by reporting DOWN, where yD is the probability that the distributor
inspects the plant that reports DOWN. Reporting DOWN is preferred by the plant if
yD <
UP (p− c)− UP (v(p)− c)
UP (p− c)− UP (v(p) − c− φ(p))
def
= ŷD ∈ (0, 1],
where ŷD ∈ (0, 1] because p > v(p) and φ(p) ≥ 0. Thus, the plant’s optimal response expressed as the







= 0 (report DOWN), if yD < ŷD;
x∗
U
∈ [0, 1], if yD = ŷD;
x∗
U
= 1 (report UP), if yD > ŷD;
(A.1)
When DOWN, x∗D = 1 (report DOWN).
Next, we analyze the distributor’s best response, given the plant’s truth-telling probability. If the plant
reports UP, the distributor knows that the plant is indeed UP (because pretending to be UP while DOWN is
a dominated strategy for the plant when p > v(p)), so the distributor will not inspect: y∗
U
= 0. If the plant
reports DOWN, the distributor forms a belief about the plant’s actual status according to the Bayes rule:
P
{




(1− xU)γ + (1− γ)
def
= α(xU) ∈ [0, γ].
Based on the above belief about misreporting, if the distributor chooses to inspect, its expected utility is




UD(f − p− k).
Without inspection, the distributor can obtain UD(f − p). Thus, the distributor will not inspect if its belief
about misreporting is below a certain level:
α(xU) <
UD(f − p)− UD(f − p− k)
UD(f − v(p)− k + φ(p))− UD(f − p− k)
def
= α̂ ∈ (0,∞). (A.2)
Because α(xU) ≤ γ, if α̂ > γ, then, regardless of the plant’s strategy xU, inequality (A.2) holds and the
distributor does not inspect. The condition α̂ > γ is equivalent to φ(p) < φ̂(p), where φ̂(p) is given below and
also defined in (1) in the paper:
φ̂(p)
def







UD(f − p− k)
)
, for p > v(p).
In other words, regardless of the plant’s strategy, a penalty payment that is below φ̂(p) will not provide sufficient
incentive for the distributor to inspect at cost k > 0. If φ(p) ≥ φ̂(p), then the distributor’s inspection decision
will depend on the plant’s truth-telling probability. The distributor will not inspect if (A.2) holds, which is
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where x̂U ∈ [0, 1) because α̂ ∈ (0, γ] when φ(p) ≥ φ̂(p).
In summary, the distributor’s best response expressed as inspection probabilities yU and yD, given the
plant’s strategy xU, is
When plant reports UP, y∗
U
= 0 (do not inspect);




If φ(p) < φ̂(p), then y∗
D
= 0 (do not inspect);
If φ(p) ≥ φ̂(p), then
y∗
D
= 1 (inspect), if xU < x̂U;
y∗
D
∈ [0, 1], if xU = x̂U;
y∗
D
= 0 (do not inspect), if xU > x̂U.
(A.3)
Combining the best response functions in (A.1) and (A.3), we derive the Bayesian equilibrium as follows.

















∈ [0, ŷD]. The distributor is indifferent among all
these equilibria, but the plant would prefer the distributor not to inspect. Thus, we assume the equilibrium
played in this scenario is the same as in (A.4).







If φ(p) > φ̂(p) and φ(p) = 0, there are many equilibria: x∗
U
∈ [0, x̂U], y∗D = 1. The plant is indifferent
among all these equilibria, but the distributor would prefer the plant to truthfully report with probability x̂U.






= 1 = ŷD.
The above Bayesian equilibria can be summarized into two cases φ(p) ≤ φ̂(p) and φ(p) > φ̂(p), which are
exactly what Proposition 1a describes.
Next, we prove the firms’ expected utilities are those in (2) and (3) in the paper for any given spot price
realization p > v(p). If φ(p) ≤ φ̂(p), the plant’s profit is zero when DOWN, and it reports DOWN when UP
to obtain a profit of p − c. Thus, the plant’s expected utility is γUP (p − c) (recall that the plant is UP with
probability γ and UP (0) = 0). Since the plant always reports DOWN in this case, the distributor always
2
purchases from the spot and obtains a utility of UD(f − p).
If φ(p) > φ̂(p), the plant’s profit is zero when DOWN. When the plant is UP, it plays a mixed strategy, so
its expected utility is equal to the utility it obtains by playing any pure strategy, e.g., reporting UP gives the
plant a utility of UP (v(p) − c). Thus, the plant’s expected utility is γUP (v(p)− c).
When the plant reports UP (which happens with probability γx∗
U
), the distributor does not inspect and
gets a profit of f−v(p). When the plant reports DOWN, the distributor plays a mixed strategy, so its expected
utility is equal to the utility it obtains by playing any pure strategy, e.g., not conducting inspection, which
gives the distributor a utility of UD(f − p). Thus, the distributor’s expected utility is γx∗UUD(f − v(p)) + (1−
γx∗
U
)UD(f − p), as shown in (3) in the paper.
Proof of Proposition 1b. The proof parallels that for Proposition 1a.
Proof of Lemma 1. We set φ(p) = ∞ and look for the optimal contract price function v(p). Consider
max
v(p)
E[UD], s.t. E[UP ] ≥ UP , where E[UP ] and E[UD] are defined in (8) in the paper. The Lagrangian is
γEUD(f − v(p)) + (1− γ)EUD(f − p) + λ
(
γEUP (v(p) − c)− UP
)
,
where λ ≥ 0 is the Lagrangian multiplier. The Euler-Lagrange equation for this problem is:
U ′D(f − v(p)) = λU ′P (v(p) − c), ∀p.
The above Euler-Lagrange equation requires the contract price to be constant: v(p) ≡ v. To determine the
optimal contract price, note that when v increases, E[UP ] increases while E[UD] decreases. Therefore, the
distributor should set the contract price at v0, determined by
γUP (v0 − c) = UP .
The distributor’s expected utility under the optimal unit-contingent truth-telling contract is
E[UD] = γUD(f − v0) + (1− γ)EUD(f − p). (A.5)
Proof of Proposition 2a. We consider a contract of the form (9) in the paper: v(p) ≡ v < v0, φ(p) = 0 if
p ∈ [v − δ, v], otherwise φ(p) = ∞. Using the equilibrium utilities given in (3), (5), and (6) in the paper, the
expected utilities of the plant and the distributor under the above contract can be expressed as:
E[UP ] = γUP (v − c) + (1− γ)
∫ v
v−δ
UP (v − p)g(p)dp, (A.6)
E[UD] = γUD(f − v) + (1− γ)
∫
p6∈[v−δ,v]








UD(f − p)− UD(f − v)
]
g(p)dp. (A.7)
We choose the parameters v and δ such that δ ∈ (0, k) and δ < v − c, and that the plant’s expected utility in
(A.6) is maintained at the reservation level UP = γUP (v0 − c). That is, v and δ also satisfy:
γ
[





UP (v − p)g(p)dp = 0. (A.8)
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To see the existence of such v and δ, note that (A.8) defines an implicit function δ(v) with δ(v0) = 0. The
function δ(v) is continuous because the left side of (A.8) is continuously differentiable in (δ, v) and its partial
derivative with respect to δ is non-zero. Therefore, there exists v such that δ(v) ∈ (0, k) and δ(v) < v − c.
By the concavity of the utility functions, for v < v0 and p ∈ [v − δ, v], we have
UD(f − v)− UD(f − v0) ≥ U ′D(f − v)(v0 − v) = U ′P (v − c)(v0 − v)
U ′D(f − v)
U ′P (v − c)
≥
[
UP (v0 − c)− UP (v − c)
]U ′D(f − v)
U ′P (v − c)
, (A.9)
UD(f − p)− UD(f − v) ≤ U ′D(f − v)(v − p) = U ′P (v − c)(v − p)
U ′D(f − v)
U ′P (v − c)
≤ UP (v − p)
U ′D(f − v)
U ′P (v − c)
, (A.10)
where the last inequality follows from UP (0) = 0 and p ≥ v − δ > c.
We now compare the distributor’s expected utility under the truth-telling contract in (A.5) with its
expected utility under the contract (9) expressed in (A.7). Taking the difference and employing the relations
in (A.9) and (A.10), we have
(A.7)− (A.5) = γ
[













UP (v0 − c)− UP (v − c)
]
− (1 − γ)
∫ v
v−δ
UP (v − p)g(p)dp
]
U ′D(f − v)
U ′P (v − c)
= 0, (A.11)
where the last equality is due to (A.8). Notice that the inequality (A.11) will be strict as long as one of the
inequalities in (A.9) and (A.10) is strict. This means that as long as one of the distributor and the plant is
risk-averse, there exists a contract in which the distributor can obtain a strictly higher utility than it would
get under a truth-telling contract, while the plant’s utility is kept constant.
Proof of Proposition 2b. The proof is included in the Technical Note.
Proof of Proposition 3 [Structural properties of the optimal contract].
a. Properties of v∗(p). Consider the problem (14) in the paper. The Lagrangian is E[UD]+λ(E[UP ]−UP ),
where E[UP ] and E[UD] are defined in (12) and (13) in the paper, and λ ≥ 0 is the Lagrangian multiplier. The
Euler-Lagrange equations for this problem are:
U ′D(f − v∗(p)) = λ
[
γU ′P (v
∗(p)− c) + (1 − γ)U ′P (v∗(p)− p)
]
, p ∈ L∗l , (A.12)
U ′D(f − v∗(p)) = λU ′P (v∗(p)− c), p 6∈ L∗l ∪ L∗r . (A.13)
There is no equation for v(p) when p ∈ L∗r , because the plant always reports DOWN when p ∈ L∗r and v(p)
does not affect the expected utilities.
(i) In the price region where misreporting is prohibited (i.e., p 6∈ L∗l ∪L∗r), eq. (A.13) implies that the contract
price is a constant, denoted as v∗(p) ≡ v1, p 6∈ L∗l ∪ L∗r , where v1 satisfies U ′D(f − v1) = λU ′P (v1 − c).
(ii) In the price region p ∈ L∗l where misreporting is not penalized, (A.12) implicitly determines v∗(p).
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∗(p)− c) + (1− γ)U ′′P (v∗(p)− p)
]
+ U ′′D(f − v∗(p))
∈ [0, 1].
If c ∈ L∗l , (A.12) becomes U ′D(f − v∗(c)) = λU ′P (v∗(c)− c), which implies v∗(c) = v1. Because v∗′(p) ≥ 0, we
have v∗(p) ≥ v1 for p ≥ c. If the plant is risk-neutral, then v∗′(p) = 0 and v∗(p) = v1 for p ∈ L∗l .
b. Properties of L∗l and L
∗
r.
(i) L∗r is to the right of L
∗
l . The proof is included in the Technical Note.
(ii) Position of L∗l . When UD(x) = x, E[UD] in (13) in the paper is the distributor’s expected profit:







Consider a contract (v(p), Ll, Lr) that has the properties in parts (i) and (ii), and p ≥ c, ∀p ∈ Ll. Suppose
there exist La ⊆ Sl\Ll and Lb ⊆ Ll such that pa > pb for any pa ∈ La, pb ∈ Lb, and
∫
La




The above equality implies that if we adjust Ll to include La but exclude Lb, the plant’s expected utility in
(12) in the paper remains unchanged. We now show that this adjustment improves (A.14). Since La and Lb
are disjoint, there exists po such that pb ≤ po ≤ pa, ∀pa ∈ La, pb ∈ Lb.
If po ∈ Ll, from part (i) we have v(po) ≥ v1 and po − pb ≥ v(po) − v(pb) because v(p) increases in p at a
rate no faster than one. If po 6∈ Ll, then v(po) = v1 ≤ v(pb). In either case, we have:
v(pa)− pa = v1 − pa ≤ v(po)− po ≤ v(pb)− pb.
Since UP (·) is strictly concave and UP (0) = 0, we have
UP (v(pb)− pb)
v(pb)− pb
































Therefore, we can improve (A.14) by replacing Lb with La, which in effect shifts Ll toward the right.
If p < c for some p ∈ Ll, we can still prove the above structure for Ll using similar arguments. The
difference is that the adjustment not only involves replacing Lb with La, but also updating v(p) for p ∈ La∪Lb.
The proof is omitted due to the length of this document.
Using similar method as above, we can show that when UP (x) = x, the distributor can improve its own
expected utility by shifting Lr toward the left.
(iii) Position of L∗r. The following proof does not rely on the risk-neutrality of any firm. Consider a
contract (v(p), Ll, Lr) that has the properties in parts (i) and (ii). Suppose there exist La ⊆ Sr\Lr and
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UP (p− c)− UP (v(p)− c)
]
g(p)dp.
Thus, if we adjust Lr to include La but exclude Lb, the plant’s expected utility in (12) in the paper remains
unchanged. We now show that this adjustment improves (13) in the paper.
Without loss of generality, we assume v(p) is non-decreasing in p for p > v(p). This can be achieved by
setting v(p) = v1 for p > v1 and setting v(p) = p− ǫ when p ≤ v1, where ǫ > 0 is small. This
Since La and Lb are disjoint, there exists po such that pa ≤ po ≤ pb, ∀pa ∈ La, pb ∈ Lb. By the concavity
of the utility functions, we have
UP (pb − c)− UP (v(pb)− c)
pb − v(pb)




UP (pa − c)− UP (v(pa)− c)
pa − v(pa)
,
UD(f − v(pa))− UD(f − pa)
pa − v(pa)




UD(f − v(pb))− UD(f − pb)
pb − v(pb)
,
















































UD(f − v(p)) − UD(f − p)
]
g(p)dp.
Notice that if at least one of the two parties is risk-averse, then at least one of the above inequalities will hold
strictly. Therefore, we can improve (13) by replacing Lb with La, which in effect shifts Lr toward the left.
Thus, the optimal Lr should be contained in the leftmost part of Sr.
(iv) Constant contract price case. When v(p) ≡ v, by definition, Sl must be to the left of Sr, and
part (i) holds. Parts (ii) and (iii) can be proven using the same approach detailed above. With a constant
contract price, the definition of Sl in (11) in the paper and the definition of φ̂(p) in (4) in the paper imply
that Sl is an interval.
Proof of Proposition 4. Throughout this proof, v(p) ≡ v. Suppose both S̃l\Ll and Lr have positive
measures. We consider shrinking Lr and expanding Ll to improve the objective. Let La ⊆ S̃l\Ll and Lb ⊆ Lr,








UP (p− c)− UP (v − c)
]
g(p)dp.
That is, E[UP ] ≥ UP remains satisfied if we add La to Ll and subtract Lb from Lr. We now show that this
adjustment improves (13). For any pa ∈ La\{v}, pb ∈ Lb\{v}, we have pa < v < pb. Because UD(·) is concave,
UD(f − pa)− UD(f − v)
v − pa
≤ U ′D(f − v) ≤




Because UP (·) is concave, UP (0) = 0, and pa > c (since pa ∈ S̃l), we have
UP (v − pa)
v − pa
≥ U ′P (v − c) ≥














UD(f − p)− UD(f − v)
v − p ·
v − p
UP (v − p)




U ′P (v − c)
∫
La
UP (v − p)g(p)dp = γ
U ′D(f − v)










UD(f − v)− UD(f − p)
p− v ·
p− v
UP (p− c)− UP (v − c)
[







UD(f − v)− UD(f − p)
]
g(p)dp.
Therefore, we can improve the objective by expanding Ll and shrinking Lr until that is not possible any more.
Hence, if Lr has a positive measure, then Ll = S̃l.
Proof of Proposition 5. For any contract (v, Ll,∅), Ll ⊂ S̃l, consider the following two contacts: (ve,∅,∅)
and (v†, L†l ,∅) with L
†
l = S̃l = [p, v
†], that yield the same average profit:
γ(v − c) + (1− γ)
∫
Ll
(v − p)g(p)dp = γ(ve − c), (A.15)





(v† − p)g(p)dp = γ(ve − c). (A.16)
Note that ve is uniquely determined from (A.15), and v† is uniquely determined from (A.16). The latter is
because γ(v − c) + (1 − γ)
∫ v
p
(v − p)g(p)dp is strictly increasing in v. Furthermore, v† < v < ve.
Summing up (A.15) and (A.16), we have


















= 2γ(ve − c).
(A.17)
Taking the difference between (A.15) and (A.16) gives





















We now show that the contract (v†, L†l ,∅) yields a lower profit variability for the plant than does the contract
(v, Ll,∅). Consider the difference of the profit variance:
E[π2P ]− E[π†2P ] =
[

































Substituting the first two terms on the right-side above using (A.17) and then combining integrals, we have:











(v − p)(v† − p)g(p)dp












Substituting the last term on the right-side above using (A.18), we have:
















Since p > v† > p for p ∈ Ll\L†l , we can enlarge the last integrand in (A.19) as follows:
(p− v†)(v − p) + (v − p)(v − p) = (p− v†)(p− p) + (v − p)(v − v†) < (v − p)(v − v†).
Then, we can combine the two integrals in (A.19) using (Ll ∩ L†l ) ∪ (Ll\L
†
l ) = Ll, and factor out (v − v†):
E[π2P ]− E[π†2P ] > (v − v†)
[

























= (v − v†)(ve − c− v + p) > 0.
where the inequality (A.20) is due to γ > 1/2 and 2ve − 2c− v+ p = (ve − v) + (ve − c) + (p− c) > 0. Hence,
the plant’s profit has a lower variance under contract (v†, L†l ,∅). For the distributor, we have

















(2f − p− v)(v − p)g(p)dp
]

















(2f − v† − v)(v − p)g(p)dp
]





where the inequality follows from p < v† < v for any p ∈ L†l \Ll, and p > v† for any p ∈ Ll\L
†
l . In the final
step, we used E[πD] = γ(f − v)+ (1− γ)(f −Ep)− (1− γ)
∫
Ll
(v− p)g(p)dp and a similar expression for E[π†D].
E[πD]− E[π†D] = 0 is because the two contracts yield the same average profit.
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